Paul Philip’s 12-year tenure as Chief Executive of the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) has been marked by significant controversy. While he oversaw headline reforms—from introducing the Solicitors Qualifying Examination (SQE) to tightening anti-money laundering (AML) rules—his leadership has drawn sharp criticism for systemic failures and perceived bias. Under Philip, the SRA has been accused of ineffective oversight, disproportionate enforcement, and institutional complacency that undermines its public interest mandate. High-profile debacles such as the collapse of Axiom Ince have prompted unprecedented scrutiny. This analysis examines key failures and controversies during Philip’s tenure and considers what his departure signifies for the future of legal regulation in England and Wales.
1. Regulatory Failures and Inefficiencies under Philip’s Leadership
Under Paul Philip, the SRA frequently faced accusations of regulatory failure – from slow responses to serious risks to overzealous action in minor matters. Despite the SRA’s public portrayal of a “transformative change”, the regulator often fell short in its core duty of timely and impartial oversight. For instance, a 2024 review by the Legal Services Board (LSB) concluded that the SRA had “fallen short of the standards expected on enforcement” and lacked assurance in its complaint-handling processes (see Legal Cheek, 2025¹). Disciplinary investigations often took years, undermining public confidence and suggesting either incompetence or resource shortages (Law Gazette, 2025²).
A notable example is the case of Sovani James, a junior solicitor punished for misconduct that many attributed to an unhealthy firm culture. The SRA’s initial harsh treatment of James – contrasted with the leniency shown to senior partners involved in similar issues – spurred widespread criticism. Only after significant backlash did the SRA introduce new rules mandating fairer workplace environments (Law360, 2024³).
2. The Axiom Ince Scandal: A High-Profile Regulatory Collapse
Few events have so starkly exposed the SRA’s failings as the collapse of Axiom Ince. Once a rapidly expanding “accumulator” firm, Axiom Ince crumbled amid financial mismanagement and allegations of fraud. By October 2023, approximately £60–£65 million in client money had vanished, leading to the loss of nearly 1,400 jobs. An independent review commissioned by the LSB concluded that the SRA “did not act adequately, effectively and efficiently” in its oversight prior to the collapse (Law Gazette, 2024⁴). The report detailed missed opportunities for intervention and found that the SRA, preoccupied with expanding its fining powers, failed to focus on fundamental safeguarding of client funds (Law Society, 2024⁵). The resultant consumer detriment and the extraordinary increase in contributions to the Compensation Fund revealed deep regulatory shortcomings.
3. Bias in Enforcement: Two-Tier Justice for Big versus Small Firms
Throughout Philip’s tenure, the SRA was accused of uneven enforcement—lenient on major City firms while punishing smaller practices and individual solicitors harshly. The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) has remarked on this imbalance, noting that City lawyers often received more favourable treatment compared to their small-firm counterparts (SDT Judgment, 2015⁶). Research commissioned by the SRA itself revealed that Black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) solicitors were overrepresented in investigations and sanctions, suggesting that small firm practitioners were particularly vulnerable (Legal Futures, 2020⁷). Critics such as Peter Herbert of the Society of Black Lawyers have argued that the SRA’s enforcement practices reflect a broader institutional bias—protecting entrenched interests while targeting the less powerful (Herbert, 2020⁸).
4. The SQE and AML Reforms: Substance or PR Exercise?
Philip presided over two headline initiatives: the introduction of the SQE and a suite of strengthened AML regulations. The SQE, introduced in 2021 to raise standards and widen access, was marred by operational issues such as clunky booking systems and marking errors, leading to considerable frustration among candidates (Law360, 2024³). Critics question whether the SQE truly ensures a consistent standard or simply lowers the bar by bypassing traditional training routes.
Similarly, while AML reforms saw the SRA imposing record fines – such as Clyde & Co’s £500,000 penalty in 2024 – these measures appear reactionary rather than preventive. The focus on expanding fining powers, rather than robust ongoing oversight, arguably distracted the SRA from its primary duty of ensuring the integrity of client funds (Law Gazette, 2024⁴). In effect, both the SQE and AML initiatives have been seen as high-profile PR exercises that fail to address deeper regulatory issues.
5. Regulatory Capture: The SRA’s Independence (or Lack Thereof)
A central question during Philip’s tenure is whether the SRA truly operates as an independent regulator. Created as the regulatory arm of the Law Society, the SRA was meant to act independently in the public interest. Despite structural changes in 2020 to bolster this independence, critics argue that the SRA remains too closely aligned with the legal profession’s establishment. The fact that disciplinary outcomes have often favoured large firms over small practitioners suggests a degree of regulatory capture (Law Gazette, 2020⁹). Furthermore, the SRA’s continual reliance on funding from practising certificate fees—and its governance links with the Law Society—casts doubt on its ability to act impartially when confronting powerful industry players (Herbert, 2020⁸).
6. Succession and Future Prospects Post-Paul Philip
In the wake of mounting pressure and crises such as Axiom Ince, Paul Philip announced his departure, effective at the end of 2025 (Legal Cheek, 2025¹). His exit has been welcomed by many within the profession as an opportunity for overdue reform. The forthcoming recruitment of a new Chief Executive, alongside Chair Anna Bradley’s extended tenure until 2026, presents a chance for the SRA to reorient itself toward genuine public accountability. Reformers argue that the new leadership must prioritise core regulatory duties—ensuring rigorous oversight of firm authorisations, client fund audits, and timely investigations—over high-profile but superficial initiatives (Law Society, 2024⁵). Without substantive change, however, the risk remains that the SRA will simply replace one insider with another, perpetuating a cycle of regulatory capture.
Conclusion Paul Philip’s tenure will be remembered as a period in which the SRA’s proclaimed “transformation” was undermined by deep-rooted systemic failings. From the catastrophic mishandling of Axiom Ince to a pervasive enforcement bias favouring large firms, the SRA’s performance under Philip frequently fell short of its public interest mandate. As new leadership looms, there is hope—but also an urgent need—for a regulator that is truly impartial, transparent, and accountable. The next chapter must prove that the SRA can enforce standards equally and protect the consumer, rather than simply serve as an arm of the profession it is meant to regulate.
Footnotes
- Legal Cheek, “SRA chief exec to step down”, 27 February 2025.
- Law Gazette, “LSB review finds SRA enforcement lacking”, 2025.
- Law360, “Case study: The Sovani James debacle and regulatory inertia”, February 2024.
- Law Gazette, “Axiom Ince collapse: SRA criticised for slow intervention”, October 2024.
- Law Society, Statement on the Axiom Ince review, October 2024.
- SDT Judgment, “Disciplinary proceedings and perceived City bias”, February 2015.
- Legal Futures, “Overrepresentation of BAME solicitors in SRA investigations”, November 2020.
- Peter Herbert, Society of Black Lawyers, “SRA enforcement and institutional bias”, November 2020.
- Law Gazette, “SRA becomes a separate legal entity: An analysis”, April 2020.