When one side is represented and the other is not, legal process can become a pressure mechanism unless judges, regulators and lawyers hold the ethical line. Vulnerable litigants in person need more than sympathy after the event. They need practical protection while proceedings are still unfolding.
Publication snapshot
- Rights of Women has raised concerns about lawyers using adversarial tactics against vulnerable women litigants in person in family proceedings.
- The issue is not robust advocacy itself, but conduct that exploits imbalance, confusion, trauma or lack of representation.
- Solicitors’ duties to clients sit alongside wider duties to the court, the administration of justice and professional integrity.
- Judges already have case-management powers that can be used to protect participation, clarify issues and prevent procedural unfairness.
- Regulators should make the boundary clear: lawyers must not use representation as leverage against people who cannot afford it.
Why this matters
A litigant in person is not simply a party without a lawyer. In many family cases, the unrepresented person may also be dealing with trauma, abuse, financial insecurity, childcare pressures, disability, language barriers or fear of the other party. Those factors can affect how they understand documents, respond to pressure and participate in hearings.
The concern raised by Rights of Women is that some lawyers may treat this imbalance as a litigation opportunity. That may include tactical applications, pressure around consent orders, unclear drafting, aggressive correspondence, expert evidence issues, or attempts to move matters forward before the unrepresented party has understood the implications.
The ethical boundary
Lawyers are entitled to advance their client’s case firmly. They are not entitled to treat instructions as a licence to mislead, intimidate, exploit or distort the process. The professional obligation is not simply to win. It is to act within the limits imposed by duties to the court, the public interest and the proper administration of justice.
That distinction matters in cases involving litigants in person. A represented party may be able to generate documents quickly, frame the issues, communicate with the court, instruct experts and deploy procedural pressure. An unrepresented party may be trying to understand the same process from scratch while also managing the emotional and practical consequences of the dispute.
Putting a client’s case clearly, testing evidence properly and making legitimate procedural applications.
Using legal knowledge, drafting control or procedural pressure to exploit an unrepresented party’s vulnerability or confusion.
The line is crossed when strategy stops being legitimate advocacy and becomes exploitation of imbalance. That is the point at which regulators, judges and professional bodies should be willing to speak plainly.
Power imbalance in family proceedings
Family proceedings can intensify every weakness in the system. The issues are personal. The stakes may involve children, safety, housing, money or ongoing contact with an abusive former partner. A vulnerable litigant may be asked to respond to technical legal arguments while under pressure that would test even an experienced party.
In that setting, apparently procedural acts can have substantive consequences. A draft order may shape what the court records. An expert instruction may influence the direction of the case. A tactical application may consume the unrepresented party’s limited time and emotional resources. A letter framed as routine may carry pressure that the recipient does not know how to resist.
How imbalance becomes injustice
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1The represented party controls the tempo.
Applications, draft orders, correspondence and expert proposals can be produced faster than the litigant in person can properly assess them.
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2The unrepresented party is placed on the back foot.
They may not know which points matter, what can be challenged, or when silence may be treated as agreement.
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3Procedural pressure becomes practical pressure.
The weaker party may agree, withdraw, concede or fail to object because the process appears too difficult to resist.
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4The record hardens.
Once an order is sealed, an expert route is accepted or an issue is missed, the disadvantage may be difficult to reverse.
The court’s role is not passive
Judicial fairness is not the same as judicial silence. Courts must remain impartial, but impartiality does not require a judge to ignore imbalance. In civil proceedings, the overriding objective expressly refers to dealing with cases justly and at proportionate cost, including equal footing, full participation, best evidence and active case management.
Family proceedings have their own procedural framework, but the principle is the same: the court must be alert to participation, vulnerability and fairness. Where one party is represented and the other is not, the judge may need to slow the process, clarify the issue, require clearer drafting, question the basis of an application or ensure that the unrepresented party understands what is being sought.
Practical court safeguards
Identify the real issue and prevent technical language from obscuring what is being decided.
Check that draft orders reflect the decision actually made and do not overreach.
Scrutinise expert proposals, credentials and the route by which evidence is introduced.
Give the litigant in person a fair opportunity to understand, respond and object.
This is not special treatment. It is practical equality. A court that permits one side’s professional fluency to overwhelm the other side’s ability to participate is not neutral in any meaningful sense.
The regulatory route
Regulators should not wait for the most serious cases before drawing the line. The clearer the professional standard, the easier it is for ethical lawyers to resist improper instructions and the harder it becomes for others to hide tactical excess behind client loyalty.
The Legal Services Board has an oversight role across legal-services regulation, while frontline regulators set and enforce standards for the professionals they regulate. The public-interest question is whether those standards are sufficiently clear when lawyers deal with unrepresented and vulnerable opponents.
What regulators should clarify
- Lawyers must not take unfair advantage of unrepresented parties.
- Draft orders must accurately reflect the court’s decision and any agreement reached.
- Expert evidence routes should be transparent, properly approved and fairly explained.
- Correspondence should not use threat, obscurity or technicality to pressure vulnerable people.
- Serious or repeated conduct concerns should be reportable and visibly enforceable.
What lawyers should record
- Why a proposed application is necessary and proportionate.
- How the litigant in person has been given clear notice of what is sought.
- Whether vulnerability, domestic abuse or participation issues are apparent.
- How any draft order matches the judge’s decision or the parties’ agreement.
- Why the lawyer’s conduct remains within duties to the court and the administration of justice.
The profession should not treat this as an attack on advocacy. It is a defence of proper advocacy. Good lawyers do not need vulnerability on the other side to win. They need evidence, law, clarity and professional judgment.
The closing point
The treatment of vulnerable litigants in person is a measure of whether access to justice is real or rhetorical. It is not enough for the system to say that people may represent themselves. The question is whether they can participate effectively once they do.
If lawyers use their professional position to exploit imbalance, regulators should say so. If draft orders misstate what has happened, judges should correct them. If expert evidence is introduced in a way that disadvantages an unrepresented party, the court should scrutinise it. If procedural pressure becomes a substitute for merits, the system should intervene before harm is done.


IT MUST BE COMMON BARRISTER PRACTICE WHICH THE JUDICIARY ACCOMODATES: IN GMC versus JOSEPH ONWUDE TRIBUNAL HEARING [26/8/2025-8/9/2025], A BARRISTER, MR ROBIN KITCHING OF MANCHESTER BEHAVED AS SUCH: “Mr Kitching took the Tribunal through the various paragraphs of the applicable version of Good Medical Practice (2014) (‘GMP’), namely paragraphs 1, 15(a), 16(a), 16(f), 17, 32, 47, 49, 50, 65, 66, 68 and 77, which he submitted were engaged by Dr Onwude’s conduct in this case. He identified dishonesty as the most serious aspect of the case, permeating much of the doctor’s conduct. He submitted that Dr Onwude giving patients the impression he was fully registered and licensed was fundamentally dishonest and demonstrated a lack of integrity. This conduct showed a blatant disregard for the entire regulatory framework, including the licensing, registration, and revalidation regimes that exist principally for patient safety. He submitted that this disregard engaged all three strands of the overarching objective. HE FAILED TO DISCLOSE THAT THE 2014 GOOD MEDICAL PRACTICE HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN ON 29/1/2024. AND THE 2014 AND 2024 VERSISONS DID NOT CONTAIN ANY PARAGRAPHS. CLEARLY, A SECTION 2 FRAUD BY FALSE REPRESENTATION AND PERVERTING THE COURT OF JUSTICE TORT WILL FOLLOW.