Written by A serious IT bug in the case management software used by HM Courts & Tribunals Service (HMCTS) has been linked to missing or hidden evidence in court cases. Instead of promptly addressing the issue, HMCTS leadership stands accused of “covering up” the flaw for several years . Internal sources say the bug — first introduced in a 2018 system rollout — caused documents and data to be obscured from view or overwritten, making key evidence effectively disappear from digital case files . Judges, lawyers, and litigants had no idea this was happening; they proceeded with hearings unaware that some evidence was missing .
“These hearings often decide the fate of people’s lives,” observed Sir James Munby, former head of the High Court Family Division, calling the situation “a scandal” and “shocking” . “An error could mean the difference between a child being removed from an unsafe environment or a vulnerable person missing out on benefits.” His words underscore the high stakes of such a failure. This wasn’t a trivial IT hiccup; it struck at the core of justice and public trust.
Evidence Lost Across Multiple Courts
The scope of the data corruption is potentially broad. While the problem first came to light in the Social Security and Child Support (SSCS) Tribunal (which hears benefit appeals), insiders say other jurisdictions were likely affected . That includes family courts, divorce cases, employment tribunals, civil claims, and probate . In other words, the bug had systemic implications across much of the civil and family justice system, not just one corner.
Key details about the HMCTS evidence bug scandal include:
- Silent data loss: The case management software (known as Judicial Case Manager or “MyHMCTS”) sometimes failed to display or retain uploaded documents. Medical records, contact details, and other vital evidence could vanish from the visible case file . Yet proceedings went on as if nothing was missing.
- Years of inaction: Warnings began as early as 2019, shortly after the system’s launch, when IT staff observed data loss issues . However, senior management refused to acknowledge the severity. It took until 2023–2024 for HMCTS to mount an internal investigation – and even that happened only after pressure from whistleblowers .
- Judgments on incomplete evidence: Because the bug persisted unchecked, judges in civil, family, and tribunal courts unwittingly made rulings without the full evidence in front of them . This raises the specter of miscarriages of justice – cases where the outcome might have been different had all the evidence been considered.
- Hidden from stakeholders: Remarkably, HMCTS did not inform judges, lawyers or the public once the bug was discovered. Management decided that alerting court users would “cause more harm than good,” opting to quietly fix issues behind the scenes . Even the Justice Secretary (Lord Chancellor) at the time was kept in the dark about the problem and its risks .
- Minimal investigation: Initial inquiries into the bug’s impact were woefully limited. An internal review in early 2024 looked at a small sample (just 3 months) of tribunal cases and identified hundreds with potential issues . Yet only 109 cases (17%) were examined fully, after which HMCTS declared the risk “low” and halted further investigation . No comprehensive audit of the years’ worth of cases potentially affected was ever done .
HMCTS officially maintains that no case outcomes have been proven to be affected by the glitch . They suggest that various “fail-safes” (like backup copies of documents) meant judges and parties ultimately had access to needed materials . But without a thorough, transparent review, that claim rings hollow. In fact, a subsequent whistleblower-led investigation (completed in late 2024) strongly criticised HMCTS for failing to grasp the full extent of the problem . The leaked report from this investigation found “large-scale” data loss incidents that should have been urgently addressed, and it confirmed HMCTS had waited years to act despite repeated internal warnings .
A Culture of Cover-Ups
Insiders describe the HMCTS response as a textbook case of institutional resistance to accountability. Instead of transparency, there was denial and deflection. One source within HMCTS described “general horror” among staff at how poorly the system was designed and how often data went missing, yet upper management refused to face reality . Multiple IT engineers raised red flags from 2019 onward, only to be ignored. According to a senior insider, “There is a culture of cover-ups. They’re not worried about risk to the public; they’re worried about people finding out about the risk to the public. It’s terrifying to witness.” This damning statement suggests that protecting the organisation’s image was prioritised over fixing the problem or alerting court users.
Such a culture has parallels to the infamous Horizon Post Office scandal, where an IT system’s flaws were concealed by management, leading to false accusations against sub-postmasters. It took nearly two decades for that cover-up to unravel. Several HMCTS sources explicitly likened their situation to Horizon . In both cases, the instinct was to suppress the truth about system failures, rather than admit mistakes and mitigate harm.
Even former Justice Secretary Alex Chalk has expressed outrage upon learning of the courts IT bug after he left office. Chalk revealed that a report on the bug reached “the desk of the senior leadership of HMCTS in March 2024 when I was in office, and it was never brought to my attention.” He told the BBC that he is “incredibly troubled” by what amounts to a deliberate cover-up by HMCTS officials . “Any Lord Chancellor…if they discover there’s potentially a situation in the courts which is leading to injustice, you will immediately want to investigate… and yet in effect that was covered up,” Chalk said, calling the situation “unbelievably serious” . For the courts agency to keep its own minister in the dark is a grave governance failure. It suggests that senior HMCTS figures – including CEO Nick Goodwin – chose not to inform even the highest levels of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) once the severity became known. If true, such an omission underscores a serious accountability deficit at the heart of the organisation.
Facing public scrutiny now, HMCTS insists that modernisation of court systems must press ahead and that lessons have been learned . But those assurances sound thin. A “root-and-branch review” of the episode is needed, as Alex Chalk has urged . When technology fails in a justice system, full transparency and swift corrective action are non-negotiable – not an internal cover-up operation.
Parallel Scandal at the Solicitors Regulator (Axiom Ince)
This is not an isolated case of an institution mishandling its digital oversight. A recent independent report into the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) – the body policing solicitors in England and Wales – revealed similar patterns of delayed action and missed warnings. The SRA’s handling of the Axiom Ince law firm scandal has been described as a “catalogue of errors and missed opportunities” , exposing another facet of the justice system where oversight failed until it was too late.
Axiom Ince was a fast-growing law firm that collapsed in 2023 amid allegations that its managing partner perpetrated a massive fraud, stealing client money. A review by an external law firm (Carson McDowell) found that the SRA could have uncovered the fraud a full year earlier, in late 2022, “but did not carry out an effective inspection” of Axiom’s accounts when red flags first emerged . Specifically, when Axiom Ince self-reported some concerns, SRA investigators failed to verify the firm’s client account balances with the bank, accepting forged documents at face value . This procedural failure was a glaring oversight. In fact, the report noted that 12 bank statements provided to the SRA were falsified, and the SRA’s outdated procedures didn’t catch it .
Compounding the problem, the SRA’s poor communication and slow response allowed Axiom’s leadership to continue moving money after suspicion had been raised. When the situation started to unravel in mid-2023, £36 million was drained from client accounts in the weeks following the initial alarm, money that might have been saved had the regulator taken swift action . This will likely lead to greater payouts from the SRA’s compensation fund – an avoidable hit that ultimately affects the wider profession and clients.
The Carson McDowell review painted a picture of an agency asleep at the wheel in the face of known risks. The SRA had been aware since 2014 that so-called “consolidator” firms (like Axiom, which rapidly acquired other firms) carried high risks . Several such firms had collapsed in the years prior, yet the SRA had no special monitoring in place. Axiom Ince wasn’t even on the SRA’s internal watchlist, due to narrow criteria . Even as Axiom embarked on audacious acquisitions – including the venerable Ince & Co in 2023 – the SRA had no procedure to assess the risks of these takeovers . In short, systemic regulatory blind spots allowed a bad actor to exploit the system.
When Axiom Ince finally imploded under the weight of the fraud, the fallout was enormous: clients left in the lurch, tens of millions missing, and one of the largest interventions in SRA history. In the aftermath, the oversight body (Legal Services Board) launched enforcement action against the SRA for its failures . The SRA’s own chair, Anna Bradley, admitted “there were some things we didn’t do right…in terms of following our processes”, though she curiously played it down as “in many respects that’s history for us” . Such a remark – “history for us” – smacks of the same defensive institutional mindset seen in the HMCTS saga. The SRA’s chief executive, Paul Philip, even pushed back on certain reforms recommended in the Axiom report, worrying they’d be too onerous . It seems even when confronted with evidence of grave missteps, some leaders reflexively resist full accountability or significant change.
The Need for Accountability and Transparency
The HMCTS evidence bug cover-up and the SRA’s Axiom Ince debacle share common themes. In both instances, critical institutions entrusted with justice and professional integrity failed their stakeholders by ignoring problems, dismissing internal warnings, and prioritising reputation over responsibility. The consequences – whether potential wrongful court rulings or millions in client funds lost to fraud – demonstrate that the cost of cover-ups is measured in human and societal harm.
What can we learn from these twin scandals?
- Transparency is paramount: Problems of this magnitude must be disclosed to those affected immediately. Had HMCTS been upfront with judges and court users about the IT bug, mitigation steps (like double-checking evidence completeness) could have occurred. Concealment only deepened the risk .
- Internal culture must change: A “culture of cover-ups” is ultimately a culture of failure . Organisations must encourage whistleblowing, heed expert warnings, and reward problem-solving – not shoot the messengers or hide the mess.
- Accountability at the top: When senior leaders withhold information from oversight (as HMCTS did with the MoJ) or downplay their mistakes (as SRA did initially), there have to be consequences. Genuine accountability might include independent inquiries, public reports, and if warranted, leadership changes. Silence and stonewalling are not acceptable responses to systemic failures.
- Don’t let modernisation outpace governance: Both incidents involve technology or innovation running ahead of oversight. Digitising courts and enabling law firm megamergers might have benefits, but robust safeguards and audits must keep pace. Investing in secure, reliable IT and enforcing compliance procedures are not optional – they are essential to prevent disasters.
- Learn from past scandals: The comparisons to the Post Office Horizon scandal are a warning sign . If institutions do not proactively learn from these events, history will repeat itself. The justice system’s credibility can ill afford another Horizon-like catastrophe, where denial persisted until countless lives were ruined.
As legal professionals and citizens, we should demand that HMCTS comes clean about the extent of the case data losses and that an independent review scrutinises whether any injustices occurred. Similarly, the SRA must demonstrate it has truly reformed its processes so that a case like Axiom Ince cannot slip through cracks again. Encouragingly, the Legal Services Board’s enforcement action will keep the pressure on the SRA . But oversight of the overseers is only part of the puzzle – we also need a culture in our public institutions that embraces accountability instead of evading it.
Both these sagas serve as a stark reminder: technology is a double-edged sword in the realm of justice. It can enhance efficiency and access, but if poorly implemented or deceptively managed, it can also undermine the very fairness and transparency that justice requires. The integrity of our courts and regulatory bodies relies not just on code and software, but on the ethical choices of those who run them. Shining light on problems is the first step; the real test is what leaders do next. Will they continue to cover up and coast along, or finally confront the issues head on? The public – and the profession – deserve nothing less than full accountability.
Conclusion: The HMCTS IT bug cover-up and the SRA’s Axiom Ince failures expose a troubling thread running through our justice system’s institutions. Systemic issues require systemic solutions. It’s time for those at the helm to remember that their ultimate duty is to the public and the rule of law – not to their own image. Only through honesty, accountability, and reform can confidence in our justice system be maintained in this digital age. The scales of justice must not be tipped by hidden hands, whether human or digital.
Disclaimer
This article is based on information available from reputable public sources, including BBC File on 4 and official reports, at the time of writing. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, some details are subject to ongoing investigation, review, or legal proceedings. References to individuals, organisations, or events are made in the context of public interest reporting and do not constitute legal advice, personal accusation, or definitive findings of fact. Readers should not rely solely on this article for legal or procedural guidance and are encouraged to consult qualified legal professionals for advice on specific matters.